Be Kind, Rewrite: Benign Projections via Rewriting Defend Against LLM Data Poisoning Attacks

John Halloran, Noopur S. Bhatt

Be Kind, Rewrite: Benign Projections via Rewriting Defend Against LLM Data Poisoning Attacks: 1 upvotes on Hugging Face Daily Papers, #47 of 54 papers on 2026-05-20. Day-by-day upvote history.

Large language models (LLMs) are highly susceptible to backdoor attacks (BAs), wherein training samples are poisoned using trigger-based harmful content. Furthermore, existing defenses have proven ineffective when extensively tested across BA patterns. To better combat BAs, we explore the use of LLM rewriting as a proactive defense against data poisoning. First, we theoretically show that when LLM rewriting utilizes open-book benign samples--termed open-book benign rewriting (OBBR)--the probability of a rewritten output being benign is strictly greater than that of closed-book rewriting. Thus, OBBR neutralizes harmful content by projecting training samples to the space of benign prompts. We then show that, in contrast to previous defenses, OBBR effectively mitigates a large number of existing BAs: across five known BAs and four widely used LLMs, OBBR increases safety performance by an average 51% compared to state-of-the-art BA defenses and 25.7% compared to closed-book rewriting methods. Finally, we show that OBBR is computationally efficient relative to other BA defenses, does not degrade model performance on natural language tasks after fine-tuning, and is capable of defending against non-trigger based data poisoning attacks.

Paper page on Hugging Face · arXiv

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